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Abstract 
This paper presents a general overview on evolution of 
concealment methods in computer viruses and defensive 
techniques employed by anti-virus products. In order to stay far 
from the anti-virus scanners, computer viruses gradually improve 
their codes to make them invisible. On the other hand, anti-virus 
technologies continually follow the virus tricks and 
methodologies to overcome their threats. In this process, anti-
virus experts design and develop new methodologies to make 
them stronger, more and more, every day. The purpose of this 
paper is to review these methodologies and outline their strengths 
and weaknesses to encourage those are interested in more 
investigation on these areas. 
Keywords: Computer Virus, Computer Antivirus, Evolution of 
Computer Viruses, Antivirus Techniques, Virus Concealment. 
1. Introduction 
Since the first days of appearance of early malwares, there 
is a big contest between virus creators and anti-virus 
experts and it is becoming more complicated every day, 
and will continue afterward. At the same time as anti-virus 
softwares are advancing their methods, on the other hand, 
the virus writers are seeking for new tactics to overcome 
them.  They utilize various techniques to put their products 
out of sight of the scanners, because if antivirus programs 
can easily find their viruses, they cannot sufficiently spread 
far in the wild. Hence, virus authors always struggle to 
create new code evolution tactics to beat against the 
detectors. Accordingly, virus techniques grew increasingly 
throughout all the years, from plainest methods to some 
more advanced strategies. 
 
Although, the anti-virus specialists generally follow the 
new techniques used in advanced malwares and attempt to 
overcome them, however, all the new defense techniques 
are not sufficient and there is an extremely necessity for 
more researches. The most important thing is to analyze 
and understand all the previous methods, well. 
 
In this paper, firstly, we give a short description on 
evolution of computer viruses and their classifications in 
aspect of concealment tactics. Then we survey the most 
common scanning and detection methods used in anti-virus 
software. Anti-virus software employed different 
methodologies in analyzing, scanning, and detecting 
viruses to provide sufficient safety for computer systems. 
In the next section, we present a comparison table that 
shows these detection methods and their features. It helps 
us to understand the advantages and disadvantages of each 
method and compare them. In the last section, we 
terminate with a conclusion and some recommendations. 
2. Evolutionary Concealment 
Computer malwares can be classified according to their 
different characteristics in several various manners, such as 
classification by target or classification by infection 
mechanism. One of these classification types is according 
to concealment techniques employed. 
2.1 Encrypted Viruses 
Encryption is practically the most primitive approach to 
take cover the operation of the virus code [1]. The ultimate 
aim of encrypted viruses is change of the virus body binary 
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codes with some encryption algorithms to hide it from 
simple view and make it more difficult to analyze and 
detect [2]. The first encrypting virus, CASCADE, 
appeared in 1988 [3]. 
 
Normally, encrypted viruses are made of two key parts: the 
encrypted body of the virus, and a small decryption code 
piece [4]. When the infected program code gets to run, 
firstly, the decryption loop executes and decrypts the main 
body of the virus. Then, it moves the control to the virus 
body. In some viruses, decryption loop performs 
something more, in addition to its main task. For instance, 
it may calculate the checksum to make sure that the virus 
code is not tampered, but as a general principle, the 
decryptor should be created as small as possible to avoid 
the anti-virus software, which is trying to exploit the 
decryptor loop’s string pattern for scanning purpose. 
 
Encryption hides the virus body from those who like to 
view the virus code or tamper the infected files using code 
viewers or hexadecimal editors [5]. However, virus 
programmers use the encryption for some reasons. Four of 
the major motivations as described by Skulason [4] are: 
1. To avoid static code analysis: Some programs try to 
analyze code automatically and generate warning if suspect 
code is found. Encryption is used to disguise suspicious 
codes and prevent static analysis.  
2. To delay the process of inspection: It can make the 
analysis process a bit more difficult and time-consuming, 
however it usually can increase the time of process only a 
few minutes. 
3. To prevent tampering: Many new variants of a virus 
can be produced with a minor change in the original virus 
code. Encryption makes it difficult to change the virus by 
non-experts. 
4. To escape from detection: an encrypted virus cannot 
be detected through simple string matching before 
decryption, because only decryptor loop has identical 
string in all variants. Hence, signature for an encrypted 
virus is limited and must be selected precisely. 
2.2 Oligomorphic Virus 
Although virus creators attempted to conceal the first 
generation of viruses with encryption methods, the 
decryptor loops were remained constantly in new infected 
files, so anti-virus software normally had no trouble with 
such virus that was inspected and for which a signature 
string was obtained. To overcome this vulnerability, virus 
writers employed several techniques to create a mutated 
body for decryptors. These efforts caused the invention of 
new type of concealment viruses, named as oligomorphic 
viruses. 
 
Oligomorphic viruses are willing to substitute the 
decryptor code in new offspring. The easiest method to 
apply this idea is to provide a set of different decryptor 
loops rather than one. Signature based detection depending 
on byte pattern of decryptor, though it is a achievable 
solution, but it is not a practical way [1]. Therefore, 
oligomorphic viruses make the detection process more 
difficult for signature based scanning engines. 
2.3 Polymorphic Virus 
The most usual approach developed in anti-virus softwares 
and tools to identify the viruses and malwares is signature-
based scanning [6]. It makes use of small strings, named as 
signatures, results of manual analysis of viral codes. A 
signature must only be a sign of a specific virus and not the 
other viruses and normal programs. Accordingly, a virus 
would be discovered, if the virus related signatures were 
found. To avoid this detection, virus can change some 
instructions in new generation and cheat the signature 
scanning. Polymorphic viruses exploit this concept. When 
the virus decides to infect a new victim, it modifies some 
pieces of its body to look dissimilar. As encryption and 
oligomorphism, scheme of polymorphism is to divide the 
code into two sections, the first part is a code decryptor, 
which its function is decryption of the second part and 
passes the execution control to decrypted code. Then, 
during the execution of this second part, a new different 
decryptor will be created, which encrypts itself and links 
both divisions to construct a new copy of the virus [7, 8]. 
 
In fact, polymorphism is a newer and progressive variety 
of oligomorphism. Concerning of encryption, polymorphic 
virus, oligomorphic and encrypted viruses are similar, but 
the exception is the polymorphic virus has capability to 
create infinite new decryptors [2, 9]. Polymorphic virus 
exploits mutation techniques to change the decryptor code. 
Furthermore, each new decryptor may use several 
encryption techniques to encrypt the constant virus body, 
as well. 
2.4 Metamorphic Virus 
Virus writers like to make the lifetime of their produced 
viruses longer, so they constantly challenge to make the 
detection as more difficult as possible for antivirus 
specialists. They have to spend a plenty of time to produce 
a new polymorphic virus that it may not be able to spread 
out broadly, but an anti-virus expert may handle the 
detection of such a virus in a short time [10]. 
 
Even for the most complicated polymorphic viruses, after 
code be emulated sufficiently, the original code will 
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become visible and can be detected by a simple string 
signature scanning [11]. 
 
Peter Szor quoted in [9], the shortest definition of the 
metamorphic virus, which defined by Igor Muttik, is 
“Metamorphics are body-polymorphics.” Because 
metamorphic viruses are not encrypted, they do not require 
decryptor. Metamorphic virus is similar to polymorphic 
virus in aspect of making use of an obfuscation engine. 
Metamorphic virus mutate all of its body, rather it changes 
the code of decryption loop. All possible techniques 
applicable by polymorphic virus to produce new decryptor 
can be used by a metamorphic virus on whole virus code to 
create a new instance. 
3. Anti-Virus Techniques 
3.1 First-Generation Scanners 
Scanners of first-generation employed not complicated 
techniques in order to find known computer viruses. 
Earliest scanners typically looked for certain patterns or 
sequences of bytes called string signatures. 
 
Once a virus is detected, it can be analyzed precisely and a 
unique sequence of bytes extracted from the virus code. 
This string often called signature of the virus and is stored 
in the anti-virus scanner database. It must be selected such 
that not likely is appeared in benign programs or other 
viruses, optimistically. This technique uses this signature 
to detect the previously analyzed virus. It searches the files 
to find signatures of the viruses. It is one of the most basic 
and simplest methods employed by antivirus scanners. 
Some examples of virus signature strings, which are 
published in Virus Bulletin [12], are given in Table 1. 
Table 1: Examples of viruses string signature 
Virus Name String Pattern (Signature) 
Accom.128
0 
89C3 B440 8A2E 2004 8A0E 2104 BA00 
05CD 21E8 D500 BF50 04CD 
Die.448 B440 B9E8 0133 D2CD 2172 1126 8955 
15B4 40B9 0500 BA5A 01CD 
Xany.979 8B96 0906 B000 E85C FF8B D5B9 D303 
E864 FFC6 8602 0401 F8C3 
 
The anti-virus engine scans the binary code of files to find 
these strings; if it encounters with a known pattern, it alerts 
detection of the matching virus. Normally, a string contain 
of sixteen unique bytes is properly adequate in size to 
distinguish a 16-bit viral code with no false positive. 
However, for 32-bit malicious codes to be recognized 
accurately, more enlarged strings are required, specifically 
if the malware is created through high level programming 
languages [1]. 
3.1.1 Special Cases in String Scanning 
Sometimes signature string scanning need some special 
conditions in bytes comparison process. Some of most 
useful exceptional cases in string scanning are [1]: 
 
(i) Wildcards: Use of wildcards allows excluding some 
constant byte values or ranges of values from comparison. 
For example, in the following string, bytes identified by 
the ‘?’ symbol are not considered in matching. The 
wildcard %2 indicates the scanner attempt to find the 
following byte value in the next two places. 
 
 8B96 09?? B000 E85C %2 FF8B D5B9 D303 E864
3.1.2 Bookmarks 
  
 
Some of earlier encrypted and polymorphic viruses are 
detectable by wildcards. Furthermore, W32/Regswap 
metamorphic virus could be detected using this method [9]. 
 
(ii) Mismatches: It allows negligible values for non-
specified quantity of bytes inside a string, regardless of 
their position. For example, the string 0A 32 B3 17 80 F6 
24 with mismatch 2, is compatible with these strings: 
 
13 0A 32 01 17 80 4D 24 72 
0A D9 1E 17 80 F6 24 AA 92 
  
(iii) Generic Degree: when a virus has more than one 
variant, the variants are analyzed to extract one unique 
string that indicates all of them. This kind of string 
scanning uses this common pattern to find any previously 
identified variants of a virus family. It often exploits 
wildcards and mismatches, as well, to cover several 
different patterns of virus family variants. 
Use of Bookmarks is a simple way to ensure a more 
reliable detection and decrease the risk of false positive. 
For example, the number of bytes located between the 
beginning of the virus code and the first byte of the 
signature can be use as a suitable bookmark. Choosing a 
reliable bookmark is virus host specific.  For example, for 
boot viruses, appropriate bookmarks may show addresses 
of boot sectors placed on the disk. In the file-infecting 
viruses, a proper bookmark can point to the offset of 
original program header. In addition, the length of the 
virus could be a very helpful bookmark.  
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3.1.3 Speed up Techniques 
Almost all anti-virus scanners overspend most of the 
search time matching input data with previously 
discovered virus signatures. Normally, scanners employ 
various types of multi signature string comparing algorithm. 
In 2005, more than 100,000 virus signatures was known 
and is increasing continuously [13]. Therefore, the 
algorithms need to be performed as faster as possible. 
There are several techniques to make the string scanning 
faster. Some of most common methods to speed up the 
searching algorithm are:     
 
Hashing: Generally, hashing techniques are commonly 
employed in searching algorithms as data structure to make 
the access to elements based on nonnumeric or large value 
keys faster and improve the speed of the process, generally. 
In anti-virus scanners, hashing is exploited in order to 
decrease the number of searching strings within the file. 
The methods may use 1 byte or 16-bit or 32-bit words of 
the scan strings to produce a hash value, which is the index 
in the hash table [14].   
 
Top-and-Tail Scanning: Because virus codes are sited 
usually at the beginning or end of the victim files, scanning 
only the first and the last parts, instead of whole file is a 
useful idea to raise the speed of signature detection 
procedure more. This procedure is known as top-and-tail 
scanning. It reduces the number of disk accesses and 
optimizes scanning speed. However, since the scanners 
will search only in some specific areas, it may produce 
false negative results and diminish the accuracy and 
reliability [14]. 
 
Entry-Point and Fixed-Point scanning: These 
techniques also help the scanning engines to execute more 
rapidly. They use the concept of the program execution 
entry-point, which is achievable by the headers of 
executable files. Because viruses the usually seek entry-
point of the file as a target, search can be started from this 
point. In order to keep the execution of a file in normal 
manner, the virus has to get the executing control from the 
original start point and pass it again to the infected file 
original entry point after it terminates its code subroutine. 
 
Fixed-point scanning is useful when there is no sufficient 
helpful string in the entry point. The scanner firstly 
specifies an initial location M. Then it tries to find every 
string that is compatible with signature, at positions M + X. 
These scanners reduce considerably the number of 
Input/Output access on disk and speed up the algorithm 
running process [1]. 
3.2  Second-Generation Scanners 
The second-generation scanners started to develop, when 
the simple pattern scanning techniques lost their efficiency 
for detecting newer and more complicated viruses, 
appropriately. In addition, this generation of scanners 
introduced exact and almost exact recognition that caused 
the antivirus scanners became more trustable. 
3.2.1 Smart Scanning 
Smart scanning refers to a defense optimizing method for 
the newer generation of viruses, which try to conceal their 
code within a sequence of worthless instructions such as no 
operation NOP instructions. 
 
When virus-mutating kits started to develop, simple 
signature-based scanning was not so effectual way because 
these pre-supplied kits could produce viruses much 
different visually from their original appearance. The 
mutation prepared tools can insert junk instructions, which 
have no effect on the execution process, among the 
program source instructions. 
 
Smart scanning skip junk instructions, like NOPs, and do 
not consider them as the virus signature bytes. In addition, 
to improve the detection possibility of variants of a virus, a 
region of the virus body is chosen which does not include 
any addresses of data or other subroutines. Furthermore, 
smart scanning is utilized for detection of macro viruses 
that are written in text formats. It can ignore some 
characters employed to transform the appearance of the 
virus code, such as Space and TAB characters, and 
consequently improve the detection procedure quality, as a 
result. 
3.2.2 Skeleton Detection 
Skeleton detection is especially effective in order to 
detection of macro viruses. It does not utilize strings or 
checksums for detection purpose [14].  
 
Eugene Kaspersky, Russian virus researcher and founder 
of the Kaspersky Anti-Virus, invented this technique and 
presented it for the first time. It reduces the searching zone 
inside a target file by removing each instruction that does 
not probably belong to the virus code before the scanning 
procedure starts. Firstly, the procedure parses statements of 
the macro virus one-by-one and removes any unimportant 
statements and all blanks gaps. Hence, the skeleton of the 
codes will be remained containing of only fundamental 
macro code, which the scanner exploit it to detect the virus 
[1]. 
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3.2.3 Nearly Exact Identification 
The purpose of nearly exact identification is more 
accurately detection of the viruses. One common method is 
to employ two strings as the signature of the virus, rather 
than only one. The virus is nearly exact identified, if both 
strings are existed in the file. Therefore, it makes 
disinfection process more reliable and risk-free, and 
ensures that the detected virus is not probable to be an 
unverified alternative of the primary version of the virus 
that maybe requires non- similar disinfection manner. 
Combination with bookmarks makes this technique more 
dependable. 
 
Exploitation of a checksum range chosen from a virus code 
is also an alteration of nearly exact identification method 
that computes a checksum of the byte values in a specific 
area of the virus body. It brings about better accuracy, 
because a larger section of the virus body can be selected, 
with no need to overload the antivirus database.  
 
In addition, it is not required to employ search strings, in 
order to implement nearly exact identification. In 
Kaspersky anti-virus algorithm, its creator, Eugene 
Kaspersky, does not make use of signature strings, instead 
employs two cryptographic checksums. These checksums 
are calculated at two specific locations, with given sizes 
inside the object. 
3.2.4 Exact Identification 
The exact identification technique utilizes non-variable 
bytes in the virus code as many as required to find a 
checksum of all bytes in the virus program, which contains 
constant value. The variable bytes of the virus body are 
ignored and a map of every constant byte is produced. This 
is the only method, which can promise an accurate 
detection of virus variants. It is often used as combination 
with the techniques of the first generation scanners. Exact 
identification method can discriminate exactly among 
various types of a virus, as well. 
 
Even though it has many profits, but implementation of 
this technique make the scanners slow, slightly. In addition, 
really it is not easy to implement it for the outsized 
computer viruses. 
3.2.5 Heuristics Analysis 
The heuristics analysis is a useful method for detection of 
new unknown malwares [15]. It is especially helpful for 
detection of macro viruses too. It can be so worthwhile for 
binary viruses, as well, but it may extremely produce false 
positive output that is a major drawback of scanners [16]. 
Users cannot trust and will not purchase such anti-virus 
software that frequently produces tremendously false 
positives. 
 
However, there are many situations, where a heuristic 
analyzer can be very valuable, and detect variants of a 
known virus family, as well. Heuristic analysis can be 
classified as two categories: static or dynamic [17]. Static 
heuristic is founded on the analysis of file structure and the 
code organization of the virus. While the static heuristic 
scanner is based on plain signs and code analysis to 
recognize the behavior of programs, the dynamic heuristic 
scanner performs CPU emulation of virus code, and tries to 
gather its information. 
 
Some examples of heuristic flags are as following items, 
which express specific structural problems, may not be 
included in benign Portable Executables that are compiled 
using a 32-bit compiler [1]: 
•  Possible Gap between Sections  
•  Code Execution Starts in the Last Section 
•  Suspicious Section Characteristics 
•  Suspicious Code Section Name 
•  Virtual Size is Incorrect in Header of PE  
•  Multiple PE Headers 
•  Suspicious Imports from KERNEL32.DLL by Ordinal 
•  Suspicious Code Redirection 
3.3   Virus-specific Detection 
Sometimes the general virus detection algorithm may not 
be able to deal with a particular virus. In such conditions, a 
virus specific detection algorithm must be developed to 
carry out detection procedure. Actually, this kind of 
detection is not a regular method, but it denotes any special 
method that is specifically designed for a given particular 
virus. This approach is also called algorithmic scanning, 
but because it can be misleading [1], we use virus-specific 
detection term instead of algorithmic scanning.  
 
This technique may bring about many problems such as 
portability of the scanner on different platforms and 
stability of the code. To overcome these problems, virus-
scanning languages have been developed that in their 
plainest form, seeking and reading operations in scanned 
objects are allowed. 
3.3.1 Filtering 
This technique is used to optimize the performance of anti-
virus engine regarding of scanning speed. It is especially 
useful in virus-specific detections because those are very 
time-consuming and high complexity in performance.  
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As a virus normally infects a particular or a set of known 
objects, signatures can be classified according to the 
infection type, such as .COM and .EXE files, boot sector, 
scripts, or macros, and so on. For example, executable 
viruses infect only programs such as .EXE and .COM, 
which are executable, macro viruses only attack to files or 
documents that can perform macro statements, and boot 
viruses place on the boot areas of disks. Through this 
exclusion action, when a specific file is searched for scan 
purpose, only the signatures relevant to its category are 
checked to keep scanning time down.  
3.3.2 Static Decryptor Detection 
As mentioned above, several types of viruses encrypt their 
body to prevent string scanning detection. In encrypted 
virus, the number of bytes, which can be used for string 
matching by scanners, is less. It makes trouble for string 
signature scanning engines. Therefore, anti-virus products 
have to use decryptor detection specific to a particular 
virus, which is not a very high quality method since it may 
produce many false negatives and false positives. In 
addition, because the virus body will not be decrypted 
during scanning, this technique cannot promise for a full 
disinfection. 
 
However, the method can be a bit faster when it is 
employed together with an efficient filtering. It can also be 
employed to find other kinds of encrypted virus, such as 
oligomorphic or polymorphic viruses.  
3.3.3 X-RAY Scanning 
The X-RAY scanning method is also a virus-specific 
approach that is used to detect viruses of encrypted 
category, as well. X-ray scanning attacks the encryption of 
the virus rather than searching for the decryptor. It works 
based on a previously identified plaintext of the virus, and 
applies all encryption methods singly on special parts of 
files, such as top or tail of the file or supposed entry-point, 
to find the given plain text in decrypted virus body. X-
raying exploits weaknesses of the virus encryption 
algorithm [18].This scanning method is able to find 
advanced polymorphic viruses, as well [1]. 
 
The following example from [18], explain a simple X-
raying. One of the most common encryption functions 
usually used in viruses is XOR operation. Each byte of the 
encoded text is resulted by applying XOR function on a 
byte of the plain text with a fixed 8-bit value between 0 
and 0xFF, which is called the encryption key. For instance, 
consider a plain text  T = E8 00 00 5D  is encrypted with 
XOR operator and encryption key k = 0x99. After 
performing encryption, T will be converted as: 
                       S = 71 99 99 C4 
 
We can decide whether  S  is an encrypted form of  T  or 
not, in two stages. Firstly, we can find the value of k, 
encryption key, a simple calculation using value of the first 
byte of S. In this example, if we assume that 71 = E8 XOR 
k, then we can infer that k = 0x99. Secondly, we can check 
and verify whether the remaining bytes of the cipher text S 
can be decoded correctly using the assumed key k or not. 
 
The weakness of this method is that it is very time-
consuming when the start of the virus is not placed at a 
fixed location, so the encryption methods have to be 
applied on a large section of the file. The considerable 
advantage of this scanning is that it decrypts completely 
the virus body, and consequently makes disinfection 
possible, even the necessary information for removing is in 
encrypted form. 
3.4   Code Emulation 
This is one of the strongest detection techniques. It 
simulates the computer central processor, main memory, 
storage resources and some necessary functions of 
operating system by a virtual machine to run the malware 
virtually and investigate its behavior and performance. The 
malicious code does not execute on actual machine and it 
is controlled by the virtual machine precisely, therefore 
there is no risk for unintentionally propagation of malware. 
 
The emulator imitates instructions of the machine by 
simulating CPU registers and flags, virtually. It resembles 
the execution of programs and detection procedure 
analyzes all instructions, individually. 
 
For polymorphic viruses or other types of encrypted codes, 
after a given quantity of iterations or after a pre-defined 
stop situation, the scanner checks the contents of memory 
of the virtual machine. After sufficient iterations, 
polymorphic virus will decrypt its encrypted body and the 
real code will be revealed in the virtual memory. Scanner 
may use the following methods to choose when it breaks 
off the emulation loop: Stopping with break points, 
Tracking of decryptor using profiles, and Tracking of 
active instructions. When the emulation terminates, the 
virus will be checked by using string pattern matching or 
other scanning techniques [1]. 
 
Veldman in [19] called more generally this method as 
Generic Detection, in the case of any kind of encrypted 
malwares. He describes it as a way to decrypt an encrypted 
virus. Essentially, a generic detection consists of four parts: 
processor emulator, memory emulator, system emulator, 
and decision mechanism [2, 19]. 
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Some more intelligent malwares alter their behavior or 
does not allow to be executed at all, if they perceive that 
there is an emulator. More about emulators and methods 
used to detect and attack emulators can be found in [20, 21, 
22]. 
3.4.1 Dynamic Decryptor Detection 
This is an attempt to detect the decryptor via emulation of 
the code. Actually, it is a method made of joining static 
decryptor detection and code emulation.  It is helpful when 
the decryption loop is very long and time-consuming and 
code emulation merely is not suitable [1].  
 
For example, it may identify the probable entry-point of 
the virus. Then, during the process, a specific algorithmic 
detection can examine the memory of virtual machines to 
find which areas have been modified. If it discovered any 
not reliable changes, extra scanning can verify the 
executed instructions and profile them, so the fundamental 
instructions set of decryptor loop can be recognized. Later 
this set can be exploited in order to detection of the virus. 
However, for the purpose of a perfect disinfection, because 
the complete decryption of the virus is required, the 
emulator has to simulate and execute the virus for a 
protracted time; accordingly, this procedure is not a 
practical approach [1]. 
 
For detecting more complicated polymorphic viruses, 
dynamic technique can be used, which employs code 
optimization procedure to make the decryptor routine 
smaller and transform it to a limited essential set of 
instructions by eliminating the dead code and non essential 
or garbage instructions, like NOPs and ineffective jumps 
that have no result. It helps to make emulation process 
faster and gives a signature for polymorphic decryptor.  
4. Comparison 
Table 2 summarized more common virus detection 
methods, which are explained above. Some more useful 
properties of detection methods are given in the table for a 
brief comparison. Symbol  means the method can 
support the property or may affect on the property 
positively. Actually, symbol  dedicates an advantage for 
the method, while symbol  shows a weakness of the 
method. In scanning speed column,  denotes that the 
method can improve the scanning speed and reduce the 
time complexity.  
 
For example, from the table it can be seen that hashing 
techniques in first-generation scanners can improve the 
scanning speed and supports complete disinfection of the 
infected host, but it cannot used for detection of variants of 
a virus family, or unknown viruses or macro viruses. It has 
no effects on the false negative or false positive alarm, as 
well, in comparison to simple string signature scanning. 
5 Conclusion and Future Recommendations 
In this paper, though we try to review all most 
conventional antivirus techniques, but not all of them can 
be covered in a short survey. 
 
Although the anti-virus software attempt to become 
updated and overcome the malwares threats, however we 
have to accept that virus authors are one step more ahead, 
because they decide how to attack first and anti-virus 
technologies have to only defense against their attacks. 
Therefore, computer virology area needs more researches 
and investigation to be able to guess the future coming 
threats.  
 
There are many weaknesses in both viruses and anti-virus 
technologies, which must be studied and known well. 
Viruses usually look for the Achilles' heels in the defense 
system and attempt to attack them. Some major problems 
in detection methods are:  
 
1 Most of detection methods are not powerful against 
evolutionary advanced or new viruses 
 
2 Scanning process usually takes a considerable amount 
of time to search a system or networks for the patterns.  
 
3 An anti-virus and its virus database need to be updated 
continually and extremely, otherwise it cannot be 
reliable. 
 
So, interested researchers on the area of computer virology 
and anti-virus technologies are strictly recommended to 
work on these most important vulnerabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Comparison table of virus detection methods according to their features 
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